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Example3Begin 
It is a scandal that in the 21st century child offenders, some of society’s most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged individuals, still die in the care of the State. Deteriorating and potentially 
lethal conditions in youth custodial institutions throw into sharp relief the ineffectiveness of 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 to operate as a deterrent 
against unsafe custody practices. Despite applying to adult and child deaths in custody, the 
Act has never been invoked to prosecute such a fatality. The applicability of corporate 
manslaughter to child deaths in custody has been almost completely neglected by legal 
scholars. This article addresses such dereliction of academic scrutiny by analysing how the 
corporate manslaughter offence might interact with the labyrinthine youth custody system. 
The conclusion is that the complexity of the system, combined with the technicalities of the 
Act, would lead to obfuscation at every step of the prosecution process. The death in custody 
provisions in the Act need to be amended if they are to provide any meaningful protection for 
vulnerable children in custody. At present the UK is not complying with its duty under 
Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950 to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions 
to deter the commission of offences against the person in custodial institutions. There must be 
systemic change in the attitudes, policies and accepted practices which generate the routine 
and systematic degradation of the rights of children in custody in the UK. 
Example3End 
Introduction 
April 2018 will be the ten-year anniversary of the commencement of the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (the Act).1 The Act was significant in that it 
                                                 
* Victoria Roper is a Senior Lecturer at Northumbria University and Raymond Arthur is a Professor of Law at Northumbria 
University. 
1 The Act received Royal Assent on 26 July 2007 and came into force on 6 April 2008, save for s 2(1)(d) and s 10. 
introduced a specific offence for corporate killing in the United Kingdom (UK) for the first 
time.2 Whilst the remit of the Act was extended in September 2011 to apply to custodial 
deaths, it was certainly not designed with these in mind. The inclusion of the death in custody 
provisions were strongly resisted by the government on the basis of cost, risk aversion and 
that existing methods of accountability were adequate, but ultimately the government 
capitulated.3 Although it has now been possible for a number of years to prosecute an 
organisation for corporate manslaughter if a child (or adult) dies in custody, no such 
prosecution has ever been attempted.  
Since 2000, at least 16 children have died in custody, four of these have been since 
September 2011. Custody strips child offenders, some of society’s most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged individuals, of their personal freedom and renders them almost entirely 
dependent on the custody provider and youth justice authorities for their health and safety. It 
appears conditions in youth custodial institutions are deteriorating. The recent Annual Report 
of the Chief Inspector of Prisons described the speed of decline in youth custody standards as 
‘staggering’4 and noted ‘the current state of affairs is dangerous, counterproductive and will 
inevitably end in tragedy unless urgent corrective action is taken’.5 
There are of course other, non-criminal accountability mechanisms in place when a child or 
adult dies in custody. Surely though if such investigations and inquests were sufficient in 
themselves, custody providers would have learnt from past errors and we would have seen a 
notable decrease in the number of deaths in custody. If anything, conditions in prisons and 
youth custodial institutions appear to be declining, as noted above. There are a number of 
reasons why the corporate manslaughter offence was extended to apply to deaths in custody. 
Firstly, it was to send a powerful symbolic message that all life is sacred, including the lives 
of vulnerable prisoners and detained children. The provisions were no doubt meant to be 
more than just a symbolic gesture though. The non-criminal accountability mechanisms were 
not proving to be effective, so the threat of a criminal sanction was hoped to provide a more 
powerful message that custodial institutions needed to get their house in order. Criminal 
sanction can only ever be effective, however, if the potential offender believes there is 
actually a chance of being prosecuted.  
Whilst the applicability of the Act to child deaths in custody has hardly received any 
academic scrutiny, some academics have briefly mentioned it or discussed issues relevant for 
both adult and child deaths in custody. Doyle and Scott undertook a fairly detailed analysis of 
the Act’s provisions in as far as they apply to prison custody, but did not scrutinise child 
custodial institutions in any depth.6 Ormerod and Taylor include some general analysis of 
custody deaths in their 2007 article, but do not discuss child custodial deaths at all7 and 
neither does Horder in his book chapter considering corporate manslaughter and public 
                                                                                                                                                        
Section ?(2)(1)(d) (duty of care owed to a person in custody) came into force on 1 September 2011.  
2 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland the offence is known as ‘corporate manslaughter’ and in Scotland it is known as 
‘corporate homicide’: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 1(5). 
3 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 460, col 664 (16 May 2007). 
4 Inspectorate of Prisons, HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales Annual Report 2016 to 2017, HC 208 (TSO, 
2017), 9. 
5 Ibid, 10.  
6 DM Doyle, S Scott, ‘Criminal Liability for Deaths in Prison Custody: The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007’ (2016) 55(3) The Howard Journal of Crime and Justice 295. 
7 D Ormerod, R Taylor, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007’ (2008) 8 Criminal Law Review 
589. 
bodies.8 Most academic scrutiny of the Act has overwhelmingly focused on worker deaths. 
As Doyle and Scott iterate: ‘scholars have tended to focus on the duty owed by private 
companies to their employees almost to the complete exclusion of the duty of [care?] owed 
by custodial institutions to those detained’.9 The applicability of corporate manslaughter to 
child deaths in custody has been severely neglected by legal scholars. This article addresses 
such dereliction of legal scrutiny by analysing how the corporate manslaughter offence might 
interact with the labyrinthine youth custody system. The youth justice system involves a 
range of public bodies, private companies and local authorities which each have various 
statutory or contractual roles to play. Rather than consider the specific complexities of the 
youth justice system (or even the wider justice system), the death in custody provisions were 
essentially bolted on to a largely finalised Bill primarily formulated with private companies 
and workplace accidents in mind. This article explores the challenges this brings to securing a 
child death in custody conviction and provides insight as to the probable reasons no 
prosecutions have been brought. The analysis in this article will highlight that the death in 
custody provisions in the Act are not fit for purpose, provide no deterrent against unsafe 
custodial practices and accordingly have not resulted in any meaningful engagement with 
protecting the rights of young people in custody, under both domestic and international law.  
The death in custody provisions in the Act should be amended to clarify areas of uncertainty 
and to ensure they have the intended deterrent effect Parliament envisaged. At present, the 
UK is not complying with its primary duty under Article 2 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (the European Convention) 
to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person in custodial institutions. There must be systemic 
change in the attitudes, policies and accepted practices that generate the routine and 
systematic degradation of the rights of children in custody in the UK. 
Legislative background 
In the 1980s and 1990s there was growing impetus for reform due to a public perception that 
private sector companies were putting profits above safety. There had been a series of high 
profile, multi-fatality, disasters10 and the annual number of workplace deaths was viewed as a 
cause for concern.11 Whilst it was possible for a company to be prosecuted under the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter12 by applying what is known as the 
identification doctrine, this was widely regarded as an ineffective mechanism for attributing 
liability.13 The identification doctrine tended to be an insurmountable hurdle to securing a 
conviction of any company with anything other than a very simple management structure.14 
                                                 
8 J Horder, Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford University Press, 2012), ch 4. 
9 Doyle and Scott, n 6 above, at p 298.  
10 For example: the sinking of the Herald of the Free Enterprise (1987); the Kings Cross Fire (1987); the Clapham Rail crash 
(1988); the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster (1988); the sinking of the Marchioness (1989); the Southall rail crash (1997); 
the Paddington rail crash (1999); and the Hatfield rail crash (2000).  
11 See discussion in Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government’s Proposals (TSO, 
2000), para. 3.1.5.  
12 As confirmed by R v P & O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 72. 
13 House of Commons Home Affairs and Work and Pensions Committees, Draft Corporate Manslaughter Bill, First Joint 
Report of Session 2005–2006, Volume 1: Report, HC 540-I (TSO, 2005), 3. See also discussion in C Wells, ‘The Law 
Commission Report on Involuntary Manslaughter: the Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and 
Peninsularity’ (1996) 8 Criminal Law Review 545.  
14 Ibid. 
Only a handful of convictions were ever secured and only then in relation to small, usually 
‘one man’ companies.15 None of the high-profile disasters had resulted in a conviction of a 
company for gross negligence manslaughter, only failed prosecutions.16 Prior to the Act, 
Crown bodies could not be charged with the common law offence because they had Crown 
immunity. 
The Act abolished the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter insofar as it 
applied to organisations17 and removed certain aspects of Crown immunity. A draft Bill in 
1996 proposed liability only for corporations.18 The second iteration in 2005 contemplated a 
wider scope of liability and the removal of Crown immunity in relation to a number of 
government departments, but made no mention of liability arising from deaths in custody.19 
The death in custody provisions were only added during the final stages of the Bill’s progress 
through Parliament, the House of Commons eventually capitulating at the dogged insistence 
of the House of Lords.20 The death in custody provisions, whilst ultimately implemented, 
were not given as much detailed consideration as the rest of the Act. For example, the 
Regulatory Impact Statement for the Bill does not even discuss deaths in custodial 
institutions.21 Doyle and Scott have described the extension of liability as ‘hasty’ and opine 
that the provisions were not given enough consideration because prisoners, unlike workers, 
did not have a powerful interest group, only a few concerned members of the House of Lords 
like Lord Hunt.22 Whilst the majority of the Act’s provisions came into force on 6 April 
2008, the death in custody provisions were implemented in 2011 by an affirmative order.23 It 
was argued that a delay in implementation was required for custody providers to ‘understand 
fully the extent of [their] obligations’ and to avoid officers becoming too risk averse.24  
Child custody context 
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) is the government department that has overarching 
responsibility for the justice system in England and Wales, including prison services.25 The 
MoJ is supported in its work by a wide range of other executive agencies and public bodies. 
In relation to youth justice specifically, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 established a new 
body corporate, the Youth Justice Board (YJB) for England and Wales.26 The YJB is a non-
                                                 
15 Ibid, at 11. 
16 For example, a prosecution arising out of the Herald of the Free Enterprise disaster failed due to issues with the 
application of the identification doctrine. See discussion in C Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 2001), 106 of earlier attempts to prosecute companies for corporate manslaughter. 
17 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 20. 
18 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter: Item 11 of the Sixth Programme of Law 
Reform: Criminal Law, Cm 237 (1996), 137.  
19 Home Office, Corporate Manslaughter: The Government’s Draft Bill for Reform (TSO, 2005), 25–28.  
20 See discussion in Doyle and Scott, n 6 above, at 297–298.  
21 Home Office, Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide: A Regulatory Impact Assessment on the Government’s 
Bill (TSO, 2006). Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/ria-
corporate-manslaughter.pdf?view=Binary (accessed 6 April 2017). 
22 Doyle and Scott, n 6 above, at 297.  
23 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Commencement No 3) Order 2011 (SI 2011/1867).  
24 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 463, col 333 (18 July 2007). 
25 See: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-justice/about#priorities (accessed 20 October 2017).  
26 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 41(1).  
departmental public body and was created to oversee the youth justice system.27 The YJB has 
traditionally been responsible for monitoring the youth justice system as well as commission 
and placements for under 18-year-old offenders. The YJB has contractual relationships with 
HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS), local authorities and private companies who 
manage various types of secure youth accommodation on its behalf. HMPPS, previously 
called the National Offender Management Service or NOMS, is the executive agency which, 
more generally, has responsibility for the commissioning, provision and regulation of 
prisons.28 In practice, HMPPS provides its day-to-day prison/youth custody operations 
through another executive agency, HM Prison Service.29 In December 2016 Charlie Taylor’s 
review of the youth justice system made recommendations for extensive reform (the 2016 
Report).30 As part of the government’s response, it was announced in February 2017 that 
operational responsibility for the youth estate would transfer to a new Youth Custody Service 
(YCS), a distinct arm of HMPPS (the new government quango mentioned above which has 
replaced NOMS).31 Accordingly, since 1 September 2017 it is the YCS which is responsible 
for deciding in which type of secure accommodation a young person is to serve their period 
of detention. The Director of the YCS will have operational responsibility for the day-to-day 
running of the youth estate, is required to keep a firm grip on performance, and will be a 
board-level member of HMPPS.32 The YJB’s commissioning function has also been 
transferred to the MoJ but the YJB retains its statutory function of providing independent 
advice and scrutiny of the youth justice system.33  
The three types of secure accommodation for children are: young offender institutions (YOI); 
secure training centres (STC); and secure children’s homes (SCH).34 A placement is made 
taking into consideration, amongst other things, the young person’s age, maturity, resilience, 
risk of harm to self/others and educational and training needs.35 YOIs house the vast majority 
of under 18s within the secure estate (around 69 percent, 605 young people, as at December 
2017)36 and most closely reflects a traditional prison environment. YOIs hold offenders aged 
15 to 21 (people under 18 are held in different buildings).37 Boys cannot be accommodated in 
YOIs unless they are aged 15 or over and there is no YOI accommodation for girls.38 YOIs 
can accommodate relatively large numbers and house between 60 to 400.39 YOIs are run by 
either HM Prison Service or private sector companies like G4S Care & Justice Services (UK) 
                                                 
27 ‘Youth Justice System’ is defined in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 42 as the system of criminal justice insofar as it 
relates to under 18s.  
28 See: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/her-majestys-prison-and-probation-service/about (accessed 20 October 
2017). 
29 See: www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-prison-service/about (accessed 20 October 2017). 
30 Ministry of Justice, Review of the Youth Justice System in England and Wales, Cm 9298 (2016).  
31 See: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/youth-justice-update (accessed 17 October 2017).  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Youth Custody Service, The Youth Custody Service Placement Team – Overview of Operational Procedures (YCS, 2017), 
12. 
35 Ibid, 7–9. 
36 Youth Justice Board, Youth Custody Report December 2017 (YJB, 2018). 
37 See: www.gov.uk/young-people-in-custody/what-custody-is-like-for-young-people (accessed 16 October 2017). 
38 Youth Custody Service, The Youth Custody Service Placement Team – Overview of Operational Procedures (YCS, 2017), 
8.  
39 See: www.gov.uk/young-people-in-custody/what-custody-is-like-for-young-people (accessed 16 October 2017).  
Limited (G4S).40 The YJB entered into a service level agreement with HMPPS (when it was 
NOMs) pursuant to which HMPPS agreed to provide over 800 custodial places in four public 
sector YOIs that accommodate under 18s (Cookham Wood, Feltham, Werrington and 
Wetherby).41 These public sector YOIs are operated by HMPPS through HM Prison Service. 
YOIs operate within many of the same rules and regulations as prisons for adults.42 The 
Youth Offender Institution Rules 2000 set out the specific and detailed rules for the 
regulation and management of YOIs.43  
Secure Training Centres (STCs) are purpose built centres which aim to provide a more 
constructive and educational environment designed to allow children the opportunity to 
develop and to stop reoffending.44 This approach requires a relatively high staff to young 
person ratio.45 STCs are designed for children aged up to 17 and house between 50 and 80 
individuals, split into units of five to eight persons.46 STCs held around 19.5 percent (171) of 
young people in the secure youth estate as at December 2017.47 There are currently three 
STCs: Oakhill, Rainsbrook and Medway. All three STCs were originally managed by G4S, 
but the running of the centres has been marred by controversy. In 2015, an Ofsted 
inspection48 found the overall effectiveness of Rainsbrook STC to be inadequate and G4S 
subsequently lost the contract to manage it to another private company, MTCnovo Ltd.49 
HMPPS (then NOMs) subsequently took over the running of Medway.50 G4S announced its 
intention sell its STC contracts in February 201651 but for the time being it continues to 
manage Medway STC.  
Secure Children’s Homes (SCH) housed 11.5 percent (100 young people) of the secure youth 
estate as at December 2017.52 They are run by local councils53 and accommodate children 
placed by the YCS (previously the YJB) as well as caring for adolescents who have been 
placed there on welfare grounds by local authorities and the courts.54 Historically, YJB 
placements represented the majority share of SCH places but recent years have seen a 
reversal of this trend.55 SCH focus on attending to the physical, emotional and behavioural 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 National Offender Management Service, National Offender Management Service Annual Report 2016/17, HC 196 (TSO, 
2017) 26. 
42 See: www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/types-of-offender/juveniles (accessed 15 November 2017).  
43 Young Offender Institution Rules 2000 (SI 2000/3371).  
44 R Arthur, Young Offenders and the Law: How the Law Responds to Youth Offending (Routledge, 2010), 107. 
45 See: www.gov.uk/young-people-in-custody/what-custody-is-like-for-young-people (accessed 16 October 2017). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Youth Justice Board, Youth Custody Report December 2017 (YJB, 2018). 
48 Ofsted, Inspection of Rainsbrook Secure Training Centre : February 2015 (Ofsted, 2015). 
49 See: www.gov.uk/government/news/contract-award-announced-for-rainsbrook-and-medway-secure-training-centres 
(accessed 19 October 2017). 
50 See: www.gov.uk/government/news/yjb-response-to-medway-improvement-board-report (accessed 19 October 2017). 
51 See: www.g4s.com/en-
GB/Media%20Centre/News/2016/02/26/G4S%20Sale%20of%20UK%20Childrens%20Services%20business (accessed 
19 October 2017).  
52 Youth Justice Board, Youth Custody Report December 2017 (YJB, 2018). 
53 See: www.gov.uk/young-people-in-custody/what-custody-is-like-for-young-people (accessed 16 October 2017). 
54 Department for Education, Children accommodated in secure children’s homes at 31 March 2017: England and Wales 
(DfE, 2017), 3. 
55 Ibid, 4.  
needs of the children they home.56 They aim to provide intensive one-on-one work with 
young people and accordingly SCHs have the highest ratio of staff to residents of the three 
types of secure accommodation. They are also generally smaller, housing around 8 to 40 
children.57 They normally accommodate children aged 10 to 14 and provide 30 hours of 
education and training a week following a school day timetable.58 There are currently 15 
SCHs in England and Wales.59  
Children in custody have often had difficult, deprived backgrounds and serious multiple 
problems in terms of their school achievement, psychological health and drug abuse.60 They 
are far more likely than the general population to have been in local authority care, to have 
suffered family breakdown or loss, to be homeless or insecurely housed and to have 
experienced child abuse. These children are the most disadvantaged, have the poorest 
educational experiences and are more likely to suffer from poor health, including mental 
health and substance misuse.  
David Lammy’s independent review of the treatment and outcomes of Black, Asian and 
Minority Ethnic (BAME) people in the criminal justice system highlighted his biggest 
concern as being the disproportionate representation of BAME groups throughout the youth 
justice system and the declining outcomes for BAME young people at a time when outcomes 
for white young people have been improving.61 Despite making up just 14 percent of the 
population, over 40 percent of young people in custody are from BAME backgrounds. The 
BAME proportion of youth prisoners has risen from 25 percent to 41 percent in the decade 
2006–2016, while numbers of young offenders in custody fell to record lows during the same 
period. The Lammy Report expressed concern about the differential treatment of BAME 
young people, for example in the magistrates’ court, for every white young male sentenced to 
custody, 1.23 young black males were sentenced to custody. Young BAME men are more 
likely to be tried in the Crown Court than their white equivalents. At the Crown Court, 
BAME defendants were more likely than white defendants to receive prison sentences for 
drug offences, even when factors such as past convictions are taken into account. Young 
BAME prisoners are also less likely to be recorded as having problems, such as mental 
health, learning difficulties and troubled family relationships, suggesting many may have 
unmet needs. 
Relevant laws and human rights issues 
There is a plethora of statutory provisions, rules, regulations and policies that govern how 
young people in custody are to be treated. For example, the Children Act 2004 sets out a 
framework of law for the safeguarding of all young people, including those in custody. The 
2004 Act places a responsibility on the governors or directors of secure establishments to 
                                                 
56 Arthur, n 44 above, 106. 
57 See: www.gov.uk/young-people-in-custody/what-custody-is-like-for-young-people (accessed 16 October 2017). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Department of Education, Children accommodated in secure children’s homes: 31 March 2017 (DfE, 2017), 3.  
60 T Gyateng, A Moretti, T May, P Turnbull, Needs and Interventions (Youth Justice Board, 2013), 39; ECOTEC, An Audit 
of Education Provision within the Juvenile Secure Estate: A Report to the Youth Justice Board (Youth Justice Board, 2001), 
9; H Fazel, N Doll, N Långström, ‘Mental Disorders Among Adolescents in Juvenile Detention and Correctional Facilities: 
A Systematic Review and Metaregression Analysis of 25 Surveys’ (2008) 47(9) Journal of the American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry 1010; Royal College of Speech & Language Therapists (2009) Locked up and Locked out: 
Communication is the key (Wales Justice Coalition, 2009), 8. 
61 D Lammy, The Lammy Review: An independent review into the treatment of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic individuals 
in the Criminal Justice System (TSO, 2017). 
promote the welfare of, and safeguard, the young people in their care.62 In addition, young 
offender institutions are required to have a specific strategy to develop the physical, mental 
and social health of young people in their care and are obliged to prevent the deterioration of 
health during custody.63 There are a number of rules, regulations and guidelines by which 
prisons are run, referred to as Prison Service Instructions (PSIs)64 and Prison Service Orders 
(PSOs).65 Most PSIs and PSOs apply to young people in the same way as they do to adult 
prisoners. Where there are particular differences for the regimes appropriate to young people, 
these will be set out in the Care and Management of Young People PSI, currently 08/2012. 
Young people who are on remand are subject to the Prison Rules 1999.66 
In R (Howard League for Penal Reform) v Secretary of State for Home Department67 
Munby J held that the duties which a local authority would otherwise owe to a child in need 
under section 17 of the Children Act 1989 do not cease to be owed merely because a child is 
currently detained in a young offender institution (YOI) or other Prison Service 
establishment, subject to the necessary requirements of imprisonment. Thus the Children Act 
1989 applies, in addition to the 2004 Act, to children in any such establishment and, 
accordingly, local authorities are under an obligation to respond to a child in need referral 
concerning a child in custody and undertake a child in need assessment, to see whether the 
child satisfies the criteria in s 17(10).68 The emphasis in the Children Acts 1989 and 2004 and 
Munby J’s judgment in R (Howard League for Penal Reform) v Secretary of State for Home 
Department is on the equality of treatment between young people in trouble and young 
people with troubles and a reminder to custodial institutions that all young people placed in 
custody, some in appalling conditions, have human rights as children which must be upheld. 
The UK has obligations towards young people in custody under the European Convention. As 
a signatory to the European Convention, the United Kingdom must uphold the fundamental 
human rights guaranteed by the Convention. The Convention rights were given further effect 
in the UK in 2000, with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act 1998. Article 2 of the 
European Convention states that the right to life of all citizens shall be protected by law. 
Article 2 is relevant to deaths in custody in two ways. Firstly, when a person dies in the 
custody of the State it will raise the question as to whether the State has complied with its 
Article 2 obligation to protect life (discussed further below). However, the obligation extends 
more widely beyond this primary obligation, as the court noted in R (Amin) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department:69 
‘The first sentence of Article 2(1) enjoins the State not only to refrain from the 
intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. It is common ground that the 
State’s obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the 
                                                 
62 Children Act 2004, s 11.  
63 Prison Service Order 3200: Health Promotion (23 October 2003). 
64 See: www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/psis (accessed 15 November 2017). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Prison Rules 1999 (SI 1999/728). 
67 [2002] EWHC 2497 (Admin), [2003] 1 FLR 484. 
68 Section 17(10): ‘a child shall be taken to be in need if—(a) he is unlikely to achieve or maintain, or to have the opportunity 
of achieving or maintaining, a reasonable standard of health or development without the provision for him of services by a 
local authority under this Part; (b) his health or development is likely to be significantly impaired, or further impaired, 
without the provision for him of such services; or (c) he is disabled’. 
69 [2003] UKHL 51, [2004] 1 AC 653. 
right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement 
machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such 
provisions.’ 
Secondly then, there is a more general question about whether by failing to impose effective 
legislation and sanction in relation to deaths in custody, the UK is in breach of its Article 2 
obligations to deter the commission of corporate manslaughter offences in custodial settings.  
The European Court of Human Rights in Kats v Ukraine70 stressed that: ‘Persons in custody 
are in a particularly vulnerable position and the authorities are under an obligation to account 
for their treatment’71 and concluded that where an individual dies in suspicious circumstances 
while in custody, this should automatically raise an issue as to whether the State has complied 
with its obligation to protect that person’s Article 2 right to life. In this case the prisoner’s 
death was the result of inadequate medical assistance in circumstances where the prison 
authorities were aware of the deceased’s HIV status. In Tyrell v HM Senior Coroner County 
Durham and Darlington72 Burnett LJ concluded that Kats broadened the positive obligations 
under Article 2 to encompass not only the obligation to take reasonable measures within the 
scope of their powers to avert a real or immediate risk to the right to life,73 but also an 
obligation to account for the cause of any death which occurs in custody.74 Edwards v United 
Kingdom75 and Amin both concerned prisoners who had been killed by their cellmates, as 
also occurred in the case of Zahid Mubarek which will be discussed later in this article. Both 
Edwards and his cellmate, Linford, were suffering schizophrenia when Edwards was killed 
by Linford. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the obligation under Article 2 to 
protect life extended to taking preventive operational measures to protect an individual 
against the criminal acts of another, where the authorities knew (or ought to have known) of a 
real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual. Information was available 
identifying Linford as posing such a risk. The failure to pass on this information, and the 
inadequate screening of Linford, amounted to a breach of Article 2. In Amin the deceased was 
a young Asian prisoner who was placed in a cell overnight with, and killed by, a prisoner 
known to be racist, extremely violent and mentally unstable. The court concluded that when 
taking prisoners into custody, the State is accountable for failures in their care. Thus, where 
prison authorities know, or ought to have known, of a real and immediate risk to the life of a 
prisoner, there exists a positive obligation to take actions to prevent this outcome. Where an 
individual dies in State custody, and where knowledge of the facts surrounding that death are 
likely to be in the hands of the State (as is always the case in State custody), Article 2 
requires that the State provide an independent investigation into that death. 
Article 3 of the European Convention may also be relevant to a death in custody. It provides 
an absolute protection against conduct that has serious physical or psychological effects on 
individuals. In Z v United Kingdom,76 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Article 
3 of the European Convention ‘enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic 
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society’ and requires States to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by State agencies or 
others, including private individuals:  
‘These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of children and 
vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which 
the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge.’  
The European Court ruled that in the context of how young people are treated by the criminal 
justice system, the main aim of Article 3 was to protect a person’s dignity and physical 
integrity.77 In Keenan v United Kingdom78 the suicide in custody of a mentally ill prisoner 
was found to breach Article 3 as there had been insufficient and inadequate monitoring and 
psychiatric assessment and the prisoner had been subjected to disciplinary measures which 
did not conform with the required standards of treatment for the mentally ill.  
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is another international 
treaty which is binding on the UK. It comprehensively promotes children’s rights – civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural – informing other human rights standards through a 
framework of state responsibilities applicable to all children within signatory States’ 
jurisdictions. Article 3 of the UNCRC requires that ‘in all actions concerning children 
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, 
administrative bodies or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be the 
paramount consideration’. In R (SR) v Nottingham Magistrates’ Court79 it was held that 
Article 3(1) applied when assessing the appropriateness of placing a 16-year-old boy in a 
YOI. This means that public authorities involved in the care and management of young 
people have an obligation to consider the best interests of the young person as a primary 
consideration. Article 40(3) of UNCRC provides that young offenders must be treated in a 
manner consistent with the promotion of the ‘child’s sense of dignity and worth … and which 
takes into account the child’s age’. Article 37 of UNCRC requires States to treat young 
people in custody with humanity and in a manner which takes into account the needs of 
persons of their age and to protect them from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Article 19 of UNCRC requires States to take all appropriate 
measures, including legislative, to protect those aged under 18 years from all forms of 
physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or 
exploitation. Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is a 
commitment binding in international law. Thus, the UK has a Conventional obligation to 
ensure that the traditional objectives of criminal justice must give way to rehabilitation and 
restorative justice objectives in dealing with young offenders. In December 2010, prior to the 
implementation of the death in custody provisions of the Act, the government made a 
commitment in a written Ministerial statement to Parliament to give ‘due regard’ to the 
UNCRC when making new policy or legislation.80 Although this commitment is not a 
statutory obligation, it does commit the government to considering the compatibility of 
legislation with the UNCRC. The UNCRC should also be read alongside the United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules) 2015, 
which require respect for the dignity and value of prisoners as human beings and the 
                                                 
77 Tyrer v United Kingdom (Application No 5856/72) (1978) 2 EHRR 1. 
78 (Application No 27229/95) (2001) 33 EHRR 913. 
79 [2001] EWHC Admin 802, 166 JP 132. 
80 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 520, col 17WS (6 December 2010). See also, Cabinet Office, Guide to making legislation (TSO, 
2014), 12.29.  
prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Custodial institutions also need to identify the individual needs of prisoners and ensure 
protection of vulnerable groups. The European Prison Rules81 are based on the UN Nelson 
Mandela Rules. These rules refer specifically to the prison authorities’ obligation to 
safeguard the health of all prisoners (rule 39). Although they are not legally binding for 
member states of the Council of Europe, they do provide recognised minimum standards of 
principles and practices in the treatment of detainees. 
Child custody in itself involves a complex set of statutory provisions, rules, regulations and 
policies. The Act was implemented without any real regard to this complexity. Custody 
providers can now theoretically be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter if a child dies in 
their care, but this has never happened in practice. In addition, if a child dies in the care of a 
State custody provider, there is also the question as to whether the UK has failed to uphold its 
European Convention and UNCRC obligations, most notably the right to life. The authors 
would argue the UK is also in breach of its Article 2 obligations by failing to impose 
effective legislation to deter the commission of corporate manslaughter in custodial settings.  
Deaths of young people in custody 
In 2014, the YJB reported that sixteen boys had died in custody since it took responsibility 
for placements and commissioning in April 2000.82 Unfortunately, there appear to have been 
at least two further deaths of children in custody since 2014. In 2015, 16-year-old Daniel 
Adewole died in his cell at Cookham Wood YOI following an epileptic fit and in 2017, the 
YJB confirmed in its Annual Report for 2016/17 that a ‘child died in one of [the YJB’s] 
commissioned secure children’s homes’.83 The vast majority of young people who die in 
custody commit suicide. Since 2000, one child has died while being restrained and one child 
has died from natural causes. The majority of deaths occur at YOIs, although there have been 
two deaths at STCs and one recent death at a SCH. See Table 1 for an overview of confirmed 
deaths in custody since 2000.  
Table 1 – Child deaths in custody since 200084 
No. Year Name Age Cause of death Type of secure 
accommodation 
1. 2017 TBC 17 TBC Newton Aycliffe SCH 
2. 2015 Daniel 
Adewole 
16 Natural causes 
(epilepsy) 
Cookham Wood YOI 
3. 2012 Alex Kelly 15 Suicide Cookham Wood YOI 
4. 2012 Jake Hardy 17 Suicide Hindley YOI 
5. 2011 Ryan Clark 17 Suicide Wetherby YOI 
6. 2007 Liam McManus 15 Suicide Lancaster Farms YOI 
7. 2005 Sam Elphick 17 Suicide Hindley YOI 
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8. 2005 Gareth Price 16 Suicide Lancaster Farms YOI 
9. 2004 Adam 
Rickwood 
14 Suicide Hassockfield STC 
10. 2004 Gareth Myatt 15 Accidental death 
while being restrained 
Rainsbrook STC 
11. 2002 Ian Powell 17 Suicide Parc YOI 
12. 2002 Joseph Scholes 16 Suicide Stoke Health YOI 
13. 2001 Kevin Jacobs 16 Suicide Feltham YOI 
14. 2001 Mark Dade 16 Suicide Wetherby YOI 
15. 2001 Anthony 
Redding 
16 Suicide Brinsford YOI 
16. 2000 Kevin Henson 17 Suicide Feltham YOI 
17. 2000 Philip Griffin 17 Suicide Wetherby YOI 
18. 2000 David Dennis 17 Suicide Brinsford YOI 
The boys whose deaths were found to be self-inflicted (or were thought to be, where inquests 
were not yet concluded), all used ligatures.85 In the hours before his death, Liam McManus 
was taunted by his fellow inmates who encouraged him to tie a ligature around his neck.86 
Similarly Jake Hardy reported being bullied at Hindley YOI but ‘no one acted to protect 
him’.87 Joseph Scholes died in HMYOI Stoke Heath in 2002. He was a vulnerable boy with a 
history of self-harming behaviour who, despite clear warnings by himself, took his own life, 
by hanging, in his prison cell just nine days into his sentence. The youngest of the boys to 
take his own life was 14-year-old Adam Rickwood who in 2004 hung himself using his 
shoelace in his room at Hassockfield STC.88 Hours before his death, Adam had been struck 
on the nose, using the so called ‘nose distraction technique’.89 He had been subjected to use 
of force because he had refused to move from a communal area to his room.90 The second 
inquest into Adam’s death concluded that this use of force was unlawful (because it could not 
be used just to maintain good order and discipline) and that it contributed to Adam’s death.91 
In a review of three child deaths in 2012, the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman found that 
there was often a conflict between processes designed to support those at risk of self-harm 
and suicide and disciplinary procedures, concluding that the ‘adult-orientated adjudication 
system appeared an inappropriate way to manage vulnerable children’.92 The Chief Inspector 
of Prisons noted in 2017 that boys in crisis at one YOI were living in cells bare of furnishings 
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and personal belongings, despite being under constant supervision.93 He admonished that 
these sterile conditions gave too much priority to mitigating risk rather than providing a 
humane environment that promoted well-being.94  
The use of restraint was also a factor in the 2004 death of Gareth Myatt at Rainsbrook STC.95 
While being restrained, Gareth vomited and died from positional asphyxia.96 The inquest 
recorded a verdict of accidental death but made 34 recommendations, 11 of which related 
directly to the governance, use and policy relating to restraint.97 Since the deaths of Gareth 
Myatt and Adam Rickwood, the YJB and other relevant bodies have changed the approved 
system for restraint. The restraint techniques used in both cases have been banned, and the 
Government commissioned an independent review.98 In 2012 a new approved system for 
restraint, Minimising and Managing Physical Restraint (MMPR), was approved for use in 
STCs and YOIs which confirms that use of force must always be viewed as the last available 
option.99 Despite this, in March 2013, the Justice Committee published its report on youth 
justice in which it expressed serious concern that: ‘despite the fact that the use of force in 
restraining young offenders has now been definitively linked to the death of at least one 
young person in custody, the use of restraint rose considerably across the secure estate last 
year’.100 Deteriorating conditions within the secure youth estate have led to a rise in the use 
of restraint as a behaviour management technique. The most recent report of the Chief 
Inspector of Prisons in 2017 has highlighted that the use of force is high at all YOIs inspected 
and had risen at Keppel, Parc and Cookham Wood.101 In 2016, a Freedom of Information Act 
request revealed that an independent medical review of restraints applied in YOIs and STCs 
suggested certain restraints carried a 40–60 percent chance of death or severe permanent 
disability affecting their everyday life.102 Clearly, an increased use of restraint means there is 
a higher risk of human rights abuses and another accidental death occurring.  
In 2015, 16-year-old Daniel Adewole was found unresponsive in his cell at Cookham Wood 
YOI following an epileptic fit. There was a delay in entering his cell and attempts at 
resuscitation proved unsuccessful. An inquest concluded that he died of natural causes and 
that whilst events at the YOI were concerning, the coroner was not satisfied Daniel’s death 
could have been prevented had his cell been entered earlier.103 An independent investigation 
into the death by the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman noted that staff did not have 
sufficient understanding of Daniel’s condition and that there was an unacceptable delay in 
going into Daniel’s cell when officers could not get a response.104 In 2000, 19-year-old Zahid 
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Mubarek was murdered by his cellmate while serving a short sentence at a Feltham YOI.105 It 
was his first time in custody. Robert Stewart, his murderer, was a known racist and had 
personality problems but was never examined by a doctor whilst at the YOI.106 An official 
inquiry into the death of Zahid Mubarek was published in 2006 and it found 186 failings that 
led to his death. It also found there was a casual disregard towards racism at Feltham.107 The 
Chief Inspector for Prisons and Probation noted in his most recent report increased levels of 
violence within the secure youth estate: ‘levels of violence had risen … in our survey, 
41 percent of children told us they had felt unsafe’.108 An increase in violence within the 
youth estate means there must be an increased risk of a child dying at the hands of another 
inmate.  
The children who die in custody are some of the most disadvantaged in society and have 
often experienced problems with mental health, self-harm, alcohol and/or drugs. Goldson and 
Coles’ research on the deaths of children in custody between 1990 and 2004 concluded that 
those who died had been ‘routinely disfigured by multiple and intersecting forms of social 
disadvantage’.109 Involvement with social services and the care system, mental health needs, 
incidence of substance misuse and domestic violence in the family and the deaths of 
significant family members were common experiences. School exclusion, ADHD diagnosis 
and drug and alcohol dependency also featured prominently. Often children are housed far 
from home and fewer custodial institutions now mean this is more likely than ever, increasing 
their sense of isolation.110 The evidence examined above suggests that youth custodial 
institutions over-emphasise the status of young people as prisoners who must be controlled 
rather than their status as children with welfare and care needs.111 This approach to young 
people in custody is further evidenced by the most recent annual report by HM Inspectorate 
of Prisons on the experiences of 720 detained children aged 12 to 18. The report found that 
staffing problems meant far too many boys were locked up in cells nearly all day (over 
22 hours per day) in YOIs and in STCs staff were being redeployed from their assigned unit 
to cover gaps elsewhere in the centre. The report also found that almost 40 percent of young 
people in YOIs had felt unsafe and 20 percent of young people in STCs said they had no one 
to turn to if they had a problem, meaning vulnerable children with complex needs were trying 
to manage their problems without support. This evidence indicates that there is a gap between 
how the youth custodial estate operates and what young people in custody actually need, as 
the very practice of imprisoning children is very damaging for those young people. This gap 
represents a significant political, organisational, and moral failure to protect the fundamental 
basic human rights of young people. Youth custody is inherently a place of danger and 
degradation that systematically undermines the welfare and rights of the young people 
incarcerated.  
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Is there any value in having and enforcing a corporate 
manslaughter offence? 
The fact that the law of corporate manslaughter applies to deaths of young people in custody 
represents a significant symbolic statement. As Gobert argued on the Act’s introduction: 
‘There is no gainsaying the importance of simply having a corporate manslaughter statute on 
the books … the Act signifies that companies and other organisations (as well as Crown 
bodies) are not above the law and are capable of committing crimes as grave as 
manslaughter’.112 The law is not only a means of social control but also symbolises the public 
affirmation of social ideals and norms and subject positions.113 The statement, announcement 
or enforcement of law can enhance the social status of groups and contribute to claims for 
social justice and human rights on behalf of victims.114  
The Act was intended to have a more tangible impact though too. One of the key aims of the 
Act was to deter offending: ‘a more effective corporate manslaughter offence would provide 
an incentive for organisations where serious failings exist in the management of health and 
safety risks to review current arrangements and organise themselves in a way that minimises 
failings that might cause death.115 The premise of the corporate manslaughter offence was 
that organisations, unlike people, can generally be expected to act rationally. Corporate 
manslaughter is not a crime of passion or motive. It is a crime committed because of 
negligence and often systemic failure. No organisation, private or public, wants to be fined, 
or wants to attract the kind of negative publicity a corporate manslaughter conviction brings. 
While public bodies, unlike private companies, are not motivated by profit, this does not 
mean a fine would be an ineffective sanction. The State does not operate as single unit and, as 
the vast majority of public bodies will have a finite pre-determined budget, the threat of a fine 
could still be a powerful disincentive. The threat of a corporate manslaughter conviction 
helps to emphasise to all organisations the importance of risk management and health and 
safety compliance. The Act cannot be said to have a deterrent effect in relation to custodial 
institutions at present, however, because this aspect of the Act is not being enforced.  
A successful prosecution under the Act could provide a powerful message about the need to 
systematically change the attitudes, policies and accepted practices that generate the routine 
and systematic degradation of children’s rights that characterise youth custody in a way that 
the various inquest findings, inspectorate reports and inquiries have not. Such a prosecution 
could provide the impetus for a re-imagining of how young people in conflict with the law 
should be treated – such as a commitment to using youth custody only as a last resort (as 
required by Article 37 of UNCRC); and where custody is used it is smaller, better resourced 
custodial institutions that are focussed on providing an individualised therapeutic 
environment primarily concerned with the welfare of young people. A lack of funding may 
be the root cause of problems within the secure youth estate. If it is, then surely a corporate 
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manslaughter conviction arising from a child’s death in custody would attract such 
widespread criticism and publicity that the government would be forced to reconsider the 
issue. Moreover, the UK is under an obligation to secure the right to life under Article 2 of 
the European Convention by putting in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person, backed up by law enforcement machinery for the 
sanctioning of such breaches. At present the law is neither effective in relation to deaths in 
custody, nor is there a realistic prospect of sanction.  
Could the Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 be used to 
prosecute a death in the secure youth estate? 
In order to secure a conviction for corporate manslaughter in relation to a death in custody in 
the secure youth estate, the prosecution would need to: 
(a) obtain consent from the Director of Public Prosecutions to bring the prosecution;116 
(b) decide which ‘organisation(s)’ (within the meaning of the Act) to prosecute;117  
(c) prove that the organisation owed a relevant duty of care to the deceased (this is a 
question of law for the judge);118 
(d) prove that there was a gross breach of the duty of care as a result of the way the 
organisation’s activities were managed or organised (this is a question of fact for the 
jury);119 
(e) prove the way in which the organisation’s activities were managed or organised by its 
senior management was a substantial element in the breach (also a question of fact for 
the jury);120 and  
(f) prove this caused the deceased to die (the usual principles of causation in criminal law 
apply.121  
Each element of the offence will be analysed sequentially to determine the difficulties in 
securing a conviction following the death of a child in custody.  
A. Consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) is required to bring any corporate 
manslaughter prosecution. Should a prosecutor team wish to bring a corporate manslaughter 
charge in relation to a death in custody, obtaining consent is the first hurdle it would have to 
overcome. Horder suggested that consent may be refused if some other more satisfactory 
means of holding the public body to account is being pursued, such as an inquiry. Although 
inquiries are not routine following a death, inquests are.122 The point has not been tested, but 
perhaps the fact an inquest has been held, or the possibility of an inquiry, might lead to 
consent being withheld. It is unlikely in practice that an inquiry will follow a death in custody 
though. Despite the numbers of young people who have died in custody, there has only ever 
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been one public inquiry and that was into the murder of 19-year-old Zahid Mubarek at 
Feltham Young Offender Institution, noted above.123 This inquiry was allowed only after a 
four-year campaign by his family and other supporters, and the report was not published until 
six years after his death. Deaths in custody raise fundamental issues about the treatment of 
young people in State custody and the protection of the human rights of society’s most 
vulnerable children.  
B. Which ‘organisation(s)’ could potentially be prosecuted? 
The offence of corporate manslaughter can be committed by a wide range of organisations: 
corporations;124 police forces;125 certain government departments and bodies listed in a 
schedule;126 and some unincorporated bodies (such as partnerships) but only where they are 
an employer.127 Private companies, such as contracted custody providers, could potentially be 
indicted for corporate manslaughter because they would fall within the definition of 
‘corporation’ in the Act which includes ‘any body corporate wherever incorporated’.128 The 
definition of ‘corporation’ would also extend to other types of corporations as well, such as 
those incorporated under statute like local authorities and the YJB.129  
There have been no prosecutions arising from a death in custody to date. Only private sector 
companies have been convicted, generally in relation to employee deaths. The decision as to 
which legal entity to prosecute in such circumstances is usually straightforward. The position 
in relation to a death in custody, whether of an adult or a young person, is potentially far 
more complex. A number of different public bodies have roles to play in the youth custody 
system and sometimes services are contracted out. Even in the event that contracting out is 
not relevant to the case, the prosecution could still face a dilemma in deciding which specific 
public body to indict. A charge of corporate manslaughter in relation to a death in custody is 
unprecedented, so a prosecutor would have no previous cases to refer to for guidance. The 
relevant parts of the 2007 Act listing the organisations to which the offence applies make no 
mention of HMPPS, HM Prison Service, or the YCS.130 The MoJ is specifically noted as an 
organisation to which the offence applies though131 and the discussion in the House of Lords 
referred to the MoJ’s potential liability, although this is not necessarily conclusive. Doyle and 
Scott discuss the potential liability of HM Prison Service132 but also imply the possibility of a 
specific YOI133 or prison134 being prosecuted. They state: ‘by virtue of Schedule 1, the 
offence of “corporate manslaughter” not only applies to private companies but also in some 
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measure to all the public bodies the performance of whose functions are most likely to cause 
deaths … these include, inter alia, the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Health and 
HM Prison Service’.135 The comment is misleading, as whilst the Ministry of Defence and 
the Department for Health are listed in the Schedule, HM Prison Service is not and never 
appears to have been so listed. Doyle and Scott appear to have unquestioningly referenced 
Horder, who also erroneously refers to HM Prison Service in his 2012 book.136 Matthews 
suggests in his guide to the Act that the offence will extend to fatalities caused by executive 
agencies because executive agencies fall under the responsibility of the relevant parent 
department137 and HM Prison Service and HMPPS are both executive agencies falling under 
the responsibility of the MoJ. No further explanation is provided by Matthews though, and it 
is presumed in such circumstances the proceedings would be brought against the MoJ rather 
than either executive agency.  
The position is potentially even more confusing in the youth justice context because there are 
additional bodies involved: the YJB (pre-1 September 2017) and now the YCB (post-
1 September 2017). Although the YJB is not specifically listed in the relevant schedule of the 
Act, it could presumably be indicted in relation to a child custody death on the basis that it is 
a statutory corporation. However, the usual position would be for the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) to ‘pursue the body that currently has responsibility for the functions 
connected with the death’.138 It is the YCS which now has responsibility for placements, but 
the status of the YCS as an organisational body within the meaning of the Act is unclear. 
Whilst it has been confirmed as a ‘distinct arm’ of HMPPS, further details are scarce and it 
does not appear to be a body corporate like the YJB. 
The position becomes even more unclear when services are contracted out to private sector 
companies. The MoJ has stated that the offence applies to all custody providers, whether 
public or private (that is, contracted service providers).139 This issue was raised in the House 
of Lords by Lord Thomas of Gresford when considering the relevant commencement order: 
‘in relation to private … prison facilities, what is the relationship between those private 
facilities and the [MoJ]? Could the department resist a charge under the … Act on the basis 
that the responsibility has been contracted out?’.140 The written response of Lord McNally, 
on behalf of the MoJ, did little to clarify matters. Whilst noting that the MoJ could not 
‘contract out’ of criminal liability, he went on to opine that ‘the liability of any particular 
organisation will depend on all the relevant circumstances …such as what the contract might 
say about the parties’ obligations’.141 He concluded that it would be ‘for the courts to 
determine where the responsibilities lie and so whether the elements of the offence are made 
out’. This is of course correct, but of little use to a prosecution team which must decide at the 
outset which organisation to pursue. Whilst a prosecution could be brought against both 
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organisations in such circumstances, this would of course involve more time and expense, 
and there is a risk that both prosecutions will not be successful.  
In summary, if a child dies in a private sector YOI or STC, it is possible that a prosecution 
could be brought against the relevant private contractor who had day-to-day control of 
operations. However, given the comments made in the House of Lords about contracted 
service provision, the prosecution might also need to consider a public sector charge and 
would be faced with the various issues discussed above when deciding which specific body 
should be indicted. In relation to a death in a public sector YOI or Medway STC (currently 
under public sector control), indicting HM Prison Service would appear to be an obvious 
choice but it is not clear that it is an organisational body within the meaning of the Act. 
Accordingly, the prosecution might need to consider whether to indict another public body 
such as the MoJ, the YJB or the YCS (although as noted above it is not clear whether the 
YCS is an organisational body either). Should a fatality occur in a SCH, a charge could be 
brought against the relevant local authority. Given that public bodies cannot contract out of 
criminal liability, a charge could also be considered against the MoJ, the YJB or the YCS.  
C. Establishing a duty of care 
It is a requirement for the organisation to have owed the deceased a ‘relevant’ duty of care as 
defined within the Act. No new duties of care are created by the Act, rather the Act confirms 
which duties owed under the law of negligence are relevant for the purposes of the offence.142 
The State also has wider obligations to protect the right to life as discussed above, but the 
wording of the Act does not suggest these will be taken into account when considering duty 
of care precepts and liability under the Act. A list of relevant duties, applicable since the 
Act’s commencement, are listed in section 2 and include, amongst others: a duty owed to 
employees or other workers; a duty owed as an occupier of premises; and a duty owed in 
relation to the supply of goods or services.143 A relevant duty of care was extended to custody 
arrangements pursuant to the addition of sections 2(1)(d) and 2(2). Accordingly, since 
1 September 2011, a duty of care owed to a person who is detained in a custodial institution 
or secure accommodation will be a relevant duty of care for the purposes of the Act.144 
Custodial institution is defined as including YOIs and STCs.145 Secure accommodation is 
defined as meaning accommodation, not constituting or forming part of a custodial 
institution, provided for the purpose of restricting the liberty of persons under the age of 
18.146 This means that a duty of care owed to a resident of any of the three types of secure 
accommodation for young people should fall within the Act’s remit.  
These provisions appear fairly clear and this might lead to the conclusion that establishing 
duty of care precepts will not be one of the major obstacles to establishing liability for a death 
in custody. However, there are some additional factors to consider: what is the exact extent of 
the duty and might the duty fall within one of a number of exclusions in the Act? It is well 
established that any organisation which is responsible for the detention of a person owes that 
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person a duty of care to take reasonable care of that person’s health and safety.147 However, 
the extent of the duty is less clear.148 In relation to suicides, the courts have held that there is 
a duty to take reasonable preventative steps but only where it is known or ought to have been 
known that the individual was a suicide risk.149 Doyle and Scott note that case law150 
suggests that there is an obligation to take reasonable steps to identify whether a prisoner 
might present a suicide risk and concluded: ‘th[is] would suggest that the … Act may only be 
applicable where the prisoner was being monitored … or where appropriate measures had not 
been taken to identify the known risk factors’.151 The same would presumably apply to a 
child in custody. Doyle and Scott also highlight that there has been no judicial consideration 
of the scope of the duty of care to prevent prisoner deaths at the hands of other prisoners.152 If 
the scope of this duty was held to be similar to the scope of the duty in relation to suicides, a 
breach of duty would presumably occur where appropriate measures had not been taken to 
segregate a violent detainee, or where a specific detainee should have been identified as being 
at risk.  
Public policy decisions are expressly excluded from being a ‘relevant’ duty of care for the 
purposes of the Act. Section 3 of the 2007 Act states that a duty of care owed by a public 
authority in respect of a decision as to matters of public policy (including in particular the 
allocation of public resources or the weighing of competing public interests) is not a relevant 
duty of care. Ormerod and Taylor have noted that the exclusion is seeking to draw a 
distinction between public policy decisions and operational decisions in the law of tort: ‘the 
manner in which a public authority implements its duty in practice has been justiciable in 
negligence, but the way it exercises its statutory discretion is not’.153 This provision indicates 
that public policy decisions relating to cutting staff numbers or reducing investment in mental 
health support services which leads to an increase in suicides should not expose a public body 
to prosecution for corporate manslaughter. However, the distinction between public policy 
and operational decisions often becomes blurred. For example, a public policy decision to cut 
staff numbers in YOIs could lead to operational negligence in the supervision of a detainee 
deemed to be a suicide risk. Ormerod and Taylor highlight that the courts have continually 
struggled with the dividing line and that it has been recognised that the test is very difficult to 
apply in practice.154  
Section 3(2) of the Act creates another type of exclusion: ‘any duty of care owed in respect of 
things done in the exercise of an exclusively public function is not a relevant duty of care 
unless it falls within section 2(1)(a)(b) or (d)’ (emphasis added). ‘Exclusively public 
function’ is defined in the Act as a function that falls within the prerogative of the Crown or 
something that is exercisable only with authority conferred by the exercise of that prerogative 
or under a statutory provision.155 Whilst imprisoning individuals seems very likely to fall 
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within the definition of an exclusively public function,156 the exclusion only applies to the 
extent a public function is not expressly included in section 2, and since 2011 a duty of care 
in relation to custody has been included in section 2(1)(d). The public function exclusion 
should not therefore prevent a prosecution being brought in relation to a death in custody 
provided the fatality occurred after the death in custody provisions were effected.  
D. Establishing gross breach and senior management involvement 
Gross negligence is required to establish liability and this means a defendant must have fallen 
far below what could have reasonably been expected in the circumstances.157 Section 8 sets 
out the factors that the jury must and may consider. It is clear that section 8 was not designed 
with deaths in custody in mind as there is no mention of factors which are specific to the 
custody context. Section 8(2) provides that the jury must consider whether the organisation 
failed to comply with any relevant health and safety legislation and, if so, to consider how 
serious a failing this was and how much of a risk of death it posed. Health and safety 
legislation is defined as ‘any statutory provision dealing with health and safety matters’ and 
the only examples provided are the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, the Health and 
Safety at Work (Northern Ireland) Order 1978 and Part 3 of the Energy Act 2013.158 None 
seem particularly relevant to, for example, a suicide or murder in custody. Whilst health and 
safety legislation might be more relevant to a death caused by an accident in a custodial 
institution, Doyle and Scott have noted that the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 is 
largely inapplicable to prisons (and a fuller discussion of accidental deaths of this type is 
outside the scope of this article).159 In a death in custody trial, the prosecution would likely 
need to rely on section 8(4) which allows (but does not require) the jury to have regard to 
‘any other matters they consider relevant’. It seems reasonable to assume a jury would 
consider things like any failure to follow suicide prevention procedures or MMPR as 
relevant, but the failure to explicitly address the custody context is symptomatic of the 
careless way in which the death in custody provisions were added to the Act.  
E. Prove senior management was a substantial element in the breach 
Securing a conviction in relation to a death in custody is made even more difficult by the 
necessity of also demonstrating that the way in which the organisation’s activities were 
organised or managed by its senior management was a substantial element in the breach.160 
The senior management ‘test’ element of the offence attracted vociferous criticism.161 ‘Senior 
management’ is defined in the Act as persons who play significant roles in the making of 
decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the organisation’s activities are to be 
managed or organised, or the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part 
of those activities.162 Whilst ‘senior management’ is a defined term, the concept is otherwise 
‘low on definitions’163 and ‘vague’.164 Despite the Act having been in force for nearly ten 
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years, we have had little judicial guidance on how the courts should interpret the senior 
management test. In the case of R v Dr Errol Cornish and Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust165 it was suggested that the prosecution did not necessarily have to name the 
relevant senior managers involved in the breach, rather it should be required to identify the 
‘tier’ of management that it considers to be the lowest level of senior management within the 
organisation that is culpable for the offence. However, the prosecution in the case ultimately 
failed and it is not clear this approach will be followed in later cases. Whilst the senior 
management definition will likely include a wider class of persons than would have been the 
case under the identification doctrine,166 and allows aggregation of a number of individuals’ 
actions,167 the senior management concept stands accused of redirecting focus back to 
individual culpability as opposed to systematic failure alone.168 
Doyle and Scott consider the senior management element of the offence to be the most 
significant barrier to securing a death in custody corporate manslaughter conviction: ‘the 
senior management test may nullify the intent of section 2(1)(d) and undermine the capacity 
of the … CPS to convict a prison for an avoidable death in custody’.169 They note that the 
death in custody provisions fail to acknowledge the complexity of the organisational structure 
within HM Prison Service which now involves many levels of management.170 They also 
remark that day-to-day implementation of procedures to prevent deaths in custody is usually 
at a non-managerial level and therefore unlikely to satisfy the senior management test.171 The 
difficulties Doyle and Scott anticipate could also be envisaged in relation to a death within an 
HM Prison Service operated YOI or STC. The secure youth estate is just, if not even more, 
organisationally complex than the adult secure estate. Whilst it should be possible to charge a 
local authority with corporate manslaughter in relation to death in a SCH, a local authority’s 
senior management may have no real involvement in SCH placements, managed by a 
separate team, making it impossible to satisfy the test. The problem could also be exacerbated 
if it is necessary to indict, for example, the MoJ because it cannot be established that HM 
Prison Service or the YCB are organisational bodies within the meaning of the Act. Trying to 
prove that the senior management of the MOJ played a substantial role in any death at a 
public custodial institution run by a separate agency (and itself having its own organisational 
structure) is likely to be a very difficult task.  
F. Causation 
The prosecution must be able to prove that the way in which the organisation managed its 
activities caused the deceased to die.172 No further guidance is included in the Act itself but 
the accompanying explanatory notes state: ‘the usual principles of causation in the criminal 
law will apply … this means that the management failure need not have been the sole cause 
of death; it need only be a cause (although intervening acts may break the chain of causation 
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in certain circumstances)’.173 At a death in custody trial, it is easy to imagine a defence team 
arguing that causation, and therefore the corporate manslaughter charge, is not proven. They 
could do this a number of ways. Firstly, Ormerod and Taylor have posited that if the ‘but for’ 
test cannot be made out then the defendant’s guilt cannot be proven: ‘if the death would have 
occurred in any event even if there had not been the management failure which constituted 
the gross breach, the offence would not be made out’.174 Secondly, even if the breach 
contributed to the death but only in a minimal way, this is not enough to establish liability. 
CPS guidance confirms that the prosecution will have to prove that the breach was a more 
than minimal contribution to the death.175 Lastly, a defendant might argue that an intervening 
act of the deceased, or perhaps another detained young person, broke the chain of causation. 
This would be particularly relevant in suicide or homicide cases. Causation is accordingly 
another potentially problematic barrier to securing a death in custody corporate manslaughter 
conviction.  
G. Sentencing 
If a public body or private sector company was to be convicted of corporate manslaughter in 
relation to a death in custody, the primary sanction would be a fine.176 Updated sentencing 
guidelines were introduced on 1 February 2016 (the Sentencing Guidelines).177 There is no 
upper limit on the fine that can be imposed, the indicative fine range is £180,000 – 
£20 million.178 The Sentencing Guidelines confirm there is a nine-step sentencing process 
and link the starting point for a fine to the turnover or, in the case of a public body the annual 
revenue budget (ARB), of the organisation.179 The Sentencing Guidelines indicate that large 
organisations (turnover/ARB of over £50 million) and medium sized organisations 
(turnover/ARB of between £10 million and £50 million) can expect multi-million pound 
fines.180 If a death in custody were to be successfully prosecuted, the convicted organisation 
could therefore potentially face a very sizeable fine. The average fine across all 
26 prosecutions to date is £324,826.181 The average fine under the updated Sentencing 
Guidelines has risen to £490,625.  
A public body convicted of corporate manslaughter would have any fine reduced in light of 
step 4 of the Sentencing Guidelines.182 This provides that any fine should normally be 
substantially reduced if a public body defendant can demonstrate the proposed fine would 
have a significant impact on its provision of services. As no public body has ever been 
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convicted of corporate manslaughter, it is unclear how the courts will interpret the meaning 
of a ‘substantial’ reduction. Whilst some commentators regard the imposition of any fine on a 
taxpayer funded, public body as somewhat futile,183 one of the purposes of sentencing is to 
reduce offending through deterrence184 and the threat of a fine could be a powerful 
disincentive to negligent practices in custodial institutions. In addition to a fine, a court can 
impose a publicity order requiring the organisation to publicise details of the conviction in a 
specified manner.185 A conviction will also generally lead to a prosecution costs order being 
made against the organisation.186 The court can also, in theory, make a remedial order 
requiring the organisation to take specified steps to remedy the breach which led to the death, 
although such an order has never been made to date.187 Thus, the 2007 Act potentially has an 
important role to play in encouraging safer custody practices. 
Conclusion 
The inclusion of the death in custody provisions in the Act is symbolically significant. It 
publically affirms the value we, as a society, place on the sanctity of life of all our citizens. 
Other methods of accountability for deaths in custody have their role to play too, but appear 
to have a limited ability to change a broken system which is one of the reasons for also 
having a criminal sanction. However, despite a significant number of adults dying in custody 
every year188 and four children dying in custody since the Act was extended to apply to 
deaths in custody, there has never been a custodial corporate manslaughter prosecution. The 
Act is all bark and no bite, at least in relation to deaths in custody. As Slapper noted in 2013, 
when there had been very few convictions under the Act, ‘Justice is mocked if an important 
law is unenforced’.189  
To have a real deterrent effect the organisations within the youth justice system must believe 
that the threat of a corporate manslaughter prosecution is real. Nor is it really surprising that 
there has never been such a prosecution given the lackadaisical way in which the death in 
custody provisions were added to the Act; an ill-advised attempt to distil the myriad 
complexities of our justice system into nothing more than a few additional sections. This 
article has explored the impediments to prosecution this approach has engendered. The Act’s 
provisions in this regard are vague and this has led to uncertainty. This is an area which 
warranted greater statutory consideration and guidance. It is likely that only the most 
tenacious of prosecutors would consider bringing an indictment and, if a prosecution ever 
were to be brought, there would be a significant risk of failure.  
The death in custody provisions of the Act should be reviewed and amended. The most 
helpful clarification would be the inclusion of guidance about which organisation a 
prosecution should normally be brought against: the MoJ, HMPPS, HM Prison Service, the 
                                                 
183 J Harris, ‘The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: unfinished business?’ (2007) 28 Company 
Lawyer 321, at 322. 
184 Sentencing Council, Health and Safety Offences, Corporate Manslaughter and Food Safety and Hygiene Offences 
Definitive Guideline (Sentencing Council, 2016), 25.  
185 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 10.  
186 A costs order has been imposed in the majority of the cases to date.  
187 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, s 9. 
188 In the 12 months to June 2017, 97 prisoners committed suicide and two were murdered, see: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/632625/safety-in-custody-quarterly-bulletin-mar-
2017.pdf (accessed 2 October 2017).  
189 G Slapper, ‘Justice is mocked if an important law is unenforced’ (2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 91, at 91. 
YCS or the YJB (as relevant). The position in relation to contracted service provision should 
also be demystified. These things would give prosecutory teams more confidence to consider 
bringing proceedings in relation to both child and adult deaths. It would also assist the 
prosecutors to weigh up the merits of a particular case knowing they were applying the 
various elements of the offence to the correct legal entity. For example, conclusions as to 
whether senior management played a substantial element in the breach might differ 
significantly depending on whether the organisation in question is the MoJ or the YCS. Given 
the plethora of statutory provisions, rules, regulations and policies that govern how young 
people in custody are treated, it would also be useful for section 8 of the Act to be amended 
to acknowledge the custody context and to refer to suicide prevention procedures, MMPR or 
anything else considered to be key in helping a jury determine if a gross breach occurred.  
As Lord Hunt of Wirral eloquently declared during the parliamentary debates on the death in 
custody provisions, ‘the power lawfully to deprive an individual of his or her liberty must be 
one of the most serious responsibilities there can be. The duty of care owed to an individual 
in detention, where he cannot act freely in his own interests, is onerous and profound’.190 
This is even more true when the individual is a child, vulnerable and at the formative stage in 
life. It is a scandal that in the 21st century children still die in the care of the State and that the 
Act provides mere lip service to accountability, rather than a meaningful reform of the law. In 
order to comply with its Article 2 obligations, the government should review and amend the 
death in custody provisions within the Act.  
A successful prosecution under the Act in relation to a death in custody would allow for the 
complete exposure of the underlying systemic issues which deny children in custody the 
same protection afforded to children in the wider community and which have cost children 
their lives – namely a youth custodial system that is poorly resourced and ill-equipped to 
respond to the complex needs of the most vulnerable children. The ‘institutional process of 
regulation’191 frequently loses sight of children’s best interests as they are often in conflict 
with the best interest of adults and of the State more generally.192 A conviction might 
therefore help to re-direct the youth custodial estate towards a normative framework better 
equipped to accommodate the realities of the difficult, deprived backgrounds and serious 
multiple problems which characterise the lives of young people in custody. We must not 
forget that children in custody are children with rights. We must move away from attitudes, 
policies and accepted practices which generate the routine and systematic degradation of 
children in custody, towards a reconceptualised philosophy which places the best interests of 
the child at the heart of the justice system.  
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